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INTRODUCTION 
In this class action lawsuit, two disability rights 
advocates have sued Steak ’n Shake under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Alleging they have 
personally experienced difficulty ambulating in their 
wheelchairs through two sloped parking facilities, these 
Plaintiffs seek to sue on behalf of all physically disabled 
individuals who may have experienced similar difficulties 
at Steak ’n Shake restaurants throughout the country. The 
District Court certified Plaintiffs’ proposed class, and 
Steak ’n Shake now appeals that certification decision. We 
are tasked with answering two questions: First, whether 
Plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the United 
States Constitution, and second, whether they have 
satisfied the requirements set out in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a). 
 As to the first question, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
have standing to bring their claims in federal court. 
Although a mere procedural violation of the ADA does not 
qualify as an injury in fact under Article III, Plaintiffs 
allege to have personally experienced concrete injuries as 
a result of ADA violations on at least two occasions. 
Further, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that these 
injuries were caused by unlawful corporate policies that 
can be redressed with injunctive relief. We withhold 
judgment as to whether those corporate policies are indeed 
unlawful, as our standing inquiry extends only so far as to 
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permit us to ensure that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled as 
much. 
As to the second question before us, we conclude 
that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Rule 23(a). The 
extraordinarily broad class certified by the District Court 
runs afoul of at least two of Rule 23(a)’s requirements. In 
light of this conclusion, the District Court’s judgment will 
be reversed, and this matter will be remanded to the 
District Court to reconsider if a class should be certified. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 12188. This matter comes 
to us pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 
which permits a court of appeals to allow “an appeal from 
an order granting or denying class-action certification.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). We exercise appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). We review a district 
court’s class certification decision under an abuse of 
discretion standard. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008). We review de 
novo the legal standards applied by a district court in 
reaching the certification decision. Id.  
A. Factual Background 
 Christopher Mielo and Sarah Heinzl (“Plaintiffs”) 
are physically disabled individuals who claim they have 
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personally experienced difficulty in ambulating through 
steeply graded parking facilities at one Steak ’n Shake 
location each. Specifically, Mielo alleges that he 
“experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to 
excessive slopes in a purportedly accessible parking space 
and access aisle”1 at a Steak ’n Shake in East Munhall, 
Pennsylvania. JA 90, 439. Heinzl alleges that she 
“experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to 
excessive surface slope in purportedly accessible parking 
spaces and access aisles, and excessive cross slope along 
the route connecting purportedly accessible parking 
spaces to the facility’s entrance” at a Steak ’n Shake in 
Pleasant Hills, Pennsylvania. JA 90, 404–07. After 
experiencing these alleged violations, neither Mielo nor 
Heinzl notified anyone at Steak ’n Shake, although they 
did contact a lawyer. JA 408–10, 441–42; see also 
National Association of Convenience Stores, National 
Grocers Association, and Food Marketing Institute Amici 
Br. 8 (stating that “21 of the 135 [ADA] Title III lawsuits 
filed in federal court in Pennsylvania in 2014 were filed 
on behalf of one of the plaintiffs in this case, Christopher 
                                              
1 An “access aisle” is a designated area located adjacent to 
an accessible parking space. As Mielo helpfully explains 
in his deposition, an “access aisle is that dash line that 
people love to park in when they shouldn’t . . . it’s that 
area, you know, for ramps or for doors to open, things like 
that.” JA 445. 
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Mielo”); Katherine Corbett, Julie Farrar-Kuhn, Carrie Ann 
Lucas, Julie Reiskin, and the Civil Rights Education and 
Enforcement Center Amici Br. 3 n.1, 18 (noting it is not 
uncommon for disability advocates to serve as repeat class 
representatives). 
In addition to these two Pennsylvania locations, 
Plaintiffs allege specific ADA violations at six other Steak 
’n Shake restaurants located throughout Pennsylvania and 
Ohio. JA 90–92. Although Mielo and Heinzl do not claim 
to have personally experienced violations at the six other 
locations,2 the law firm representing them hired an 
investigator who visited these locations and recorded 
evidence purportedly supporting the existence of 
violations. JA 90. Relying on the investigator’s 
discoveries at these six additional locations, as well as 
their own experiences at the East Munhall and Pleasant 
Hills locations, Mielo and Heinzl seek to enjoin Steak ’n 
Shake on a national basis by requiring the company to 
adopt corporate policies relating to ADA compliance. 
There are over 500 Steak ’n Shake restaurants located 
                                              
2 Mielo and Heinzl have visited other Steak ’n Shake 
locations in the past, but each alleges to have personally 
experienced ADA violations at only one restaurant 
location. JA 411, 446–51. 
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throughout the United States, approximately 417 of which 
are at issue in this appeal.3  
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs’ complaint requests both “a declaration 
that [Steak ’n Shake’s] facilities violate federal law,” and 
“an injunction requiring [Steak ’n Shake] to remove the 
identified access barriers so that [Steak ’n Shake’s] 
facilities are fully accessible to, and independently usable 
by individuals with mobility disabilities, as required by the 
ADA.” JA 87. Plaintiffs propose novel interpretations of 
the ADA and its corresponding regulations, according to 
which Steak ’n Shake would not only be required to 
correct access barriers, but would also be required to adopt 
corporate policies directing Steak ’n Shake employees to 
continually search for hypothetical access barriers that 
might need correcting. Despite the novelty of these 
                                              
3 Specifically, there are “approximately 562 Steak ’n 
Shake locations in 33 states.” Appellant Br. 6. Of those 
locations, 144 are franchised restaurants. Because Steak ’n 
Shake does not build or maintain the parking facilities at 
franchised locations, that leaves approximately 417 at 
issue in this appeal involving a proposed class limited to 
restaurant locations where Steak ’n Shake “owns, controls 
and/or operates the parking facilities.” JA 75; see also 
Appellee Br. 41 (“This case seeks to challenge the same 
policies and practices that are applied uniformly to 
approximately 417 restaurants.”). 
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interpretations, Steak ’n Shake has not yet filed a motion 
to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.  
On April 27, 2017, the District Court granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). JA 75. The certified class was 
defined as follows: 
All persons with qualified mobility 
disabilities who were or will be denied the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 
accommodations of any Steak ’n Shake 
restaurant location in the United States on the 
basis of a disability because such persons 
encountered accessibility barriers at any 
Steak ’n Shake restaurant where Defendant 
owns, controls and/or operates the parking 
facilities. 
JA 75. As part of its certification ruling, the District Court 
appointed Mielo and Heinzl as class representatives. JA 
75.  
In certifying the class, the District Court analyzed 
the underlying law in this case. Although discussion of 
such underlying law must necessarily be limited when 
conducting the standing analysis here, Cottrell v. Alcon 
Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (referring to the 
“fundamental separation between standing and merits at 
 11 
 
the dismissal stage”), that law is intertwined with our Rule 
23 inquiry. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307 (“[T]he 
court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to 
class certification, even if they overlap with the merits—
including disputes touching on elements of the cause of 
action.”); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 
591 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that a “court cannot be bashful” 
when determining “whether there is actual conformance 
with Rule 23”). In light of this overlap, we briefly lay out 
the law upon which Plaintiffs rest their claims.  
C. Applicable Law and Theory of Harm 
The ADA seeks to “provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 
U.S.C § 12101. Title III of that landmark civil rights law 
specifically prohibits discrimination against the disabled 
in the full and equal enjoyment of any place of public 
accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III 
applies to buildings built both before and after the ADA’s 
enactment. Specifically, Title III requires “places of public 
accommodation”4 to “remove architectural barriers … in 
existing facilities … where such removal is readily 
                                              
4 Steak ’n Shake restaurants qualify as places of public 
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B) (referring to “a 
restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or 
drink”). 
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achievable,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and to 
“design and construct facilities for first occupancy [no] 
later than 30 months after July 26, 1990, that are readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 
except where an entity can demonstrate that it is 
structurally impracticable to meet the requirements of such 
subsection.” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). 
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to require Steak ’n 
Shake to adopt centralized corporate policies crafted to 
ensure that potential discriminatory access violations are 
actively sought out and corrected. Plaintiffs seek to do so 
pursuant to the ADA, which permits private individuals to 
seek injunctive relief. As 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)(2) 
provides: 
(1) Availability of remedies and procedures.  
The remedies and procedures set forth in 
section 2000a-3(a)5 of this title are the 
                                              
5 Section 2000a-3(a) provides a private right of action. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (“Whenever any person has engaged or 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is 
about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 
2000a-2 of this title, a civil action for preventive relief, 
including an application for a permanent or temporary 
injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be 
instituted by the person aggrieved. . . .”). Section 2000a-2 
prohibits any person from “withhold[ing], deny[ing], or 
attempt[ing] to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to 
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remedies and procedures this subchapter 
provides to any person who is being 
subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
disability . . . . 
(2) Injunctive relief.  
In the case of violations of sections 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)6 and section 12183(a)7 of 
                                              
deprive any person of any right or privilege secured by 
section 2000a or 2000a-1 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
2. Section 2000a provides, in part, that “[a]ll persons shall 
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Section 2000a-1 provides, in part, 
that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to be free, at any 
establishment or place, from discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a-1. 
 
6 Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) defines discrimination to 
include “a failure to remove architectural barriers, and 
communication barriers that are structural in nature, in 
existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily 
achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 
7 Section 12183(a) defines discrimination to include both 
“a failure to design and construct facilities for first 
occupancy later than 30 months after July 26, 1990, that 
are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
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this title, injunctive relief shall include an 
order to alter facilities to make such facilities 
readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities to the extent 
required by this subchapter. Where 
appropriate, injunctive relief shall also 
include requiring the provision of an 
auxiliary aid or service, modification of a 
policy, or provision of alternative methods, to 
the extent required by this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)(2). Of the many interconnected 
sections mentioned within the statutory language laid out 
above, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) is perhaps the most 
relevant to our Rule 23(a) analysis.8 We must, therefore, 
look at it closely.  
                                              
disabilities, except where an entity can demonstrate that it 
is structurally impracticable,” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1), as 
well as older buildings that are altered after July 26, 1990. 
42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). 
 
8 Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) is particularly important to 
our Rule 23(a)(2) inquiry. Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) 
refers to the term “architectural barriers,” which, as 
outlined in the ADA’s corresponding regulations, is a 
broad term that covers a large swath of restaurant features 
from parking spaces to bathroom mirrors. See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.304(b) (listing “[e]xamples of steps to remove 
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Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) states that, for purposes 
of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a),9 the term “discrimination” shall 
include a “failure to remove architectural barriers . . . 
where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182. While the ADA itself fails to define 
“architectural barriers,” the Department of Justice’s ADA 
Guide for Small Businesses defines “architectural 
barriers” as: 
[P]hysical features that limit or prevent 
people with disabilities from obtaining the 
goods or services that are offered. They can 
include parking spaces that are too narrow to 
accommodate people who use wheelchairs; a 
step or steps at the entrance or to part of the 
selling space of a store; round doorknobs or 
door hardware that is difficult to grasp; aisles 
that are too narrow for a person using a 
wheelchair, electric scooter, or a walker; a 
                                              
barriers”). As Part III.B. will explain, this presents a Rule 
23(a)(2) commonality issue since class members may have 
been injured by different types of architectural barriers. 
9 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“General rule. No individual shall 
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”). 
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high counter or narrow checkout aisles at a 
cash register, and fixed tables in eating areas 
that are too low to accommodate a person 
using a wheelchair or that have fixed seats 
that prevent a person using a wheelchair from 
pulling under the table. 
ADA Guide for Small Businesses, at 3, available at 
https://www.ada.gov/smbusgd.pdf. The Department of 
Justice promulgated guidelines pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12186 (providing that “the Attorney General shall issue 
regulations”).  
 One regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.211 (“Section 211”), 
is of central importance to Plaintiffs’ theory of harm. That 
regulation arguably refers to a restaurant’s “ongoing” 
maintenance obligation, providing: 
Maintenance of accessible features. 
(a) A public accommodation shall maintain 
in operable working condition those features 
of facilities and equipment that are required 
to be readily accessible to and usable by 
persons with disabilities by the Act or this 
part. 
(b) This section does not prohibit isolated or 
temporary interruptions in service or access 
due to maintenance or repairs. . . . 
28 C.F.R. § 36.211. As the District Court interpreted 
Section 211: 
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Title III’s implementing regulations . . . 
require places of public accommodation to 
maintain in operable working condition those 
features of facilities and equipment that are 
required to be readily accessible to and usable 
by persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.211(a). This ongoing obligation broadly 
covers all features that are required to be 
accessible under the ADA. 
JA 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we 
must refrain from engaging in a freewheeling merits 
analysis while undertaking our inquiries into standing and 
Rule 23’s requirements, we nevertheless note the weight 
that Section 211 must bear in order to support Plaintiffs’ 
case in chief. To summarize Plaintiffs’ theory of harm, the 
ADA and its corresponding regulations not only require 
Steak ’n Shake to correct discriminatory access violations, 
but also to adopt policies for ADA compliance that require 
Steak ’n Shake to actively seek out potential violations.10 
                                              
10 Referring to the “gravamen” of their lawsuit, Plaintiffs 
contend that “liability is premised on the fact that [Steak 
’n Shake’s] current policies and practices directly result in 
unidentified access violations that are addressed only 
when individuals with disabilities complain . . . .” 
Appellee Br. 22. As Plaintiffs elaborate, “[a]fter 
construction, [Steak ’n Shake] does not conduct ADA-
specific assessments at any of its restaurants to ensure that 
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the restaurants remain ADA compliant.” Appellee Br. 6. 
Further, Plaintiffs complain that Steak ’n Shake’s 
“established maintenance procedures similarly ignore the 
ADA,” and that the company’s “maintenance employees 
do not receive any training with regard to ADA 
compliance issues, thus making it unlikely that ADA-
related issues would be identified on an ad hoc basis.” 
Appellee Br. 7. 
 Plaintiffs implicitly argue that it would be good 
policy to interpret Section 211 to require places of public 
accommodation to actively seek out access violations, as 
compared to correcting access violations as they are 
discovered. See Appellee Br. 37 (arguing that Steak ’n 
Shake “effectively . . . push[es] its obligation to maintain 
the accessibility of its restaurants onto customers”). But 
while relieving customers of the burden of bringing access 
violations to the attention of restaurants might be good 
policy, it appears to be in tension with the very policy 
which Congress codified in the text of the ADA.  
In enacting the ADA, Congress made clear that “the 
nature and cost” of a particular action, as well as “the 
overall financial resources of the facility or facilities 
involved in the action,” must be taken into account when 
determining whether a particular access violation 
constitutes ADA “discrimination” that must be corrected. 
42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). In doing so, Congress heeded the 
obvious: places of public accommodation have finite 
resources to allocate to correcting access violations.  
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In light of our inability to fully engage the merits at this 
stage of the litigation, we are not at liberty to decide 
whether Plaintiffs’ novel interpretation of the ADA and its 
corresponding regulations would survive a dispositive 
motion under either Rule 12(b)(6), or Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING 
 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must 
have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and 
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 
(2016). As “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction,” a 
plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing these elements.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1997); 
see also Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 
187, 194 (3d Cir. 2016).  
                                              
The text of the ADA seems to suggest, then, that 
disabled patrons like Mielo and Heinzl are better served 
when restaurants are required to spend their limited 
financial resources on correcting only the access violations 
that disabled patrons have actually brought to the 
restaurant’s attention—rather than requiring those 
establishments to expend their limited resources in an 
ongoing search for potential violations that may not exist.  
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In the class action context, our standing inquiry 
focuses solely on the class representative(s). As we 
squarely held in Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 
“putative class members need not establish Article III 
standing. Instead, the ‘cases or controversies’ requirement 
is satisfied so long as a class representative has standing, 
whether in the context of a settlement or litigation class.” 
Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 
(3d Cir. 2015). Given that restriction, we turn to the 
allegations put forward by Mielo and Heinzl and 
determine whether, as class representatives, they satisfy all 
three elements of standing.  
A. Injury in Fact 
 The primary element of standing is injury in fact, 
and it is actually a conglomerate of three components. See 
Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To establish an injury in 
fact, a plaintiff must first “show that he or she suffered ‘an 
invasion of a legally protected interest.’” Id. at 1548 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Second, a plaintiff must 
show that the injury is both “concrete and particularized.” 
Id. Third, a plaintiff must also show that his or her injury 
is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
Id.  
 In determining whether Plaintiffs have suffered an 
invasion of a legally protected interest, we must carefully 
“separate our standing inquiry from any assessment of the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 162. 
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Unlike a Rule 23 inquiry, where courts are often required 
to make factual and legal determinations pertaining to a 
plaintiff’s underlying cause of action, our standing inquiry 
must avoid any consideration of the merits beyond a 
screening for mere frivolity. Initiative & Referendum Inst. 
v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(“[A] plaintiff whose claimed legal right is so preposterous 
as to be legally frivolous may lack standing on the ground 
that the right is not ‘legally protected.’”). Here, although 
Plaintiffs’ theory may not ultimately prove successful on 
the merits, Plaintiffs present a colorable argument that the 
ADA requires Steak ’n Shake to adopt new policies 
requiring them to actively seek out and correct access 
violations. Given the constraints on our ability to subject 
Plaintiffs’ claims to additional scrutiny at this point, we 
are satisfied that they have alleged a non-frivolous claim 
that they suffered an invasion of a legally protected 
interest.11  
                                              
11 In Cottrell, we pondered whether the phrase “legally 
protected interest” constituted a third component of the 
injury in fact inquiry, or was instead “simply a 
reformulation of the other components of injury in fact.” 
Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2017). 
We noted, for example, that the phrase had “not appeared 
with regularity in Supreme Court opinions addressing 
standing.” Id. at 163. But since Cottrell, the Supreme 
Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018), 
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 The second component of injury in fact requires that 
an alleged injury be both “concrete” and “particularized.” 
To the extent that Plaintiffs allege only a harm in the mere 
existence or absence of particular corporate policies, 
Plaintiffs lack standing. As we recognized in Cottrell, 
“[b]are procedural or technical violations of a statute alone 
will not satisfy the concreteness requirement.” Cottrell, 
874 F.3d at 167 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).12 
Therefore, even assuming that Steak ’n Shake violated the 
ADA by failing to have an adequate ADA compliance 
policy in place, the mere nonexistence of such a policy 
would not afford Plaintiffs a basis to establish standing. In 
other words, Plaintiffs would still need to show how the 
lack of a policy resulted in a concrete harm that was 
particular to them. Because Plaintiffs do not allege how 
                                              
which provides further guidance for courts undertaking a 
standing analysis. In Gill, the Supreme Court again 
referred to the “invasion of a legally protected interest” as 
a distinct component of the injury in fact inquiry. Gill, 138 
S. Ct. at 1929. In light of Gill, we clarify that the phrase 
“invasion of a legally protected interest” does constitute a 
distinct component of the injury in fact inquiry. A plaintiff 
must sufficiently allege to have suffered such an invasion 
in order to establish Article III standing.  
 
12 This is not to say, however, that Spokeo foreclosed 
standing for all procedural violations—it did so only for 
those that are “bare.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (2016). 
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the mere nonexistence of a particular corporate policy 
constitutes a concrete harm in and of itself,13 they cannot 
rely on the want of such a policy as a basis for standing. 
 But although Plaintiffs’ complaint could be read as 
alleging no more than mere procedural violations of the 
ADA, our caselaw requires us to “examine the allegations 
in the complaint from a number of different angles to see 
if [plaintiffs’] purported injury can be framed in a way that 
satisfies Article III.” Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 197. Further 
examining Plaintiffs’ complaint in light of this obligation, 
we conclude that they have sufficiently alleged a concrete 
harm in the form of experiencing actual physical difficulty 
in ambulating through parking facilities which are 
allegedly not ADA-compliant.14 Moreover, because 
                                              
13 This is not to say that the nonexistence (or existence) of 
a corporate policy can never be a liability-triggering act 
that causes a concrete harm. As we explain in Part II.B., 
although an allegedly unlawful policy is not itself a 
concrete harm, it can qualify, at least at the pleading stage, 
as the cause of concrete harms that Plaintiffs claim they 
have experienced when attempting to ambulate through 
parking facilities which violate the ADA.  
 
14 Although we conclude that these alleged physical harms 
qualify as “concrete,” we point out that “‘concrete’ is not 
. . . necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’” Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  
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Plaintiffs allege they personally experienced these 
concrete injuries, we further conclude that they have 
sufficiently alleged an injury that is particular to them. 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“We have made it clear time 
and time again that an injury in fact must be both concrete 
and particularized.”) (emphases added). 
 Of course, Plaintiffs seek to require Steak ’n Shake 
to correct alleged ADA violations at more than the two 
restaurant locations where they claim to have actually 
experienced injury. Highlighting Plaintiffs’ 
geographically expansive request, Steak ’n Shake argues 
that Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek relief beyond 
the East Munhall and Pleasant Hills locations. Appellant 
Br. 57–59. In taking this tack, however, Steak ’n Shake 
conflates Article III standing with requirements of Rule 
23.  
As we made clear in Neale, “a properly formulated 
Rule 23 class should not raise standing issues.” Neale, 794 
F.3d at 368. Rather than “shoehorn . . . questions into an 
Article III analysis,” the standing inquiry must be limited 
to a consideration of the class representatives themselves, 
after which we may “employ Rule 23 to ensure that classes 
are properly certified.” Id. With Neale in mind, we reject 
Steak ’n Shake’s invitation to insert Rule 23 issues into 
our inquiry on standing.  
 Finally, the third component of the injury in fact 
inquiry requires Plaintiffs to show that their injury is actual 
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or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. After 
conceptualizing Plaintiffs’ alleged injury as experiencing 
physical difficulty in the form of ambulating through 
allegedly unlawful parking facilities, it is clear that this 
third subcomponent is easily satisfied. The physical 
injuries of which Plaintiffs complain are not merely 
hypothetical or conjectural, they have actually occurred.15 
                                              
15 Steak ’n Shake contends that Plaintiffs do not have 
standing to seek injunctive relief at either the East Munhall 
or Pleasant Hills locations. Appellant Br. 55–57. As Steak 
’n Shake argues, “there is no evidence establishing any 
likelihood that Plaintiffs will return to those two respective 
locations.” Appellant Br. 55. Steak ’n Shake’s argument is 
unpersuasive. Although Steak ’n Shake makes much of the 
unsurprising fact that Plaintiffs do not purport to know the 
exact date of their next visit to a Steak ’n Shake restaurant, 
this argument misses the point. Plaintiffs contend they are 
currently “deterred from returning to [Steak ’n Shake] 
facilities.” JA 93 (Complaint). This allegation is supported 
by record evidence illustrating that Plaintiffs have visited 
many Steak ’n Shake restaurant locations in the past, and 
that Plaintiffs enjoy the food offered at those restaurants. 
See, e.g., JA 737–40, 751–54. In this sense, the injury 
providing Plaintiffs with standing to seek injunctive relief 
is not merely hypothetical or even imminent—it is actual, 
in that this allegedly unlawful deterrence is something that 
Plaintiffs are currently suffering. See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12188(a)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall require a 
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We conclude, therefore, that Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged that they suffered an injury in fact. 
B. Traceability 
 The second element of standing requires Plaintiffs 
to establish that their alleged injury in fact “is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant.” 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. As we have previously 
explained, this element is not satisfied if the alleged injury 
is merely “the result of the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.” Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 
193. Moreover: 
This requirement is akin to “but for” 
causation in tort and may be satisfied even 
where the conduct in question might not have 
been a proximate cause of the harm. An 
indirect causal relationship will suffice, 
provided that there is a fairly traceable 
connection between the alleged injury in fact 
and the alleged conduct of the defendant. 
Id. at 193–94 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs allege 
that their injuries were “caused” by Steak ’n Shake’s 
                                              
person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such 
person has actual notice that a person or organization 
covered by this subchapter does not intend to comply with 
its provisions.”). 
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unlawful corporate policies. In other words, Plaintiffs 
allege that “but for” Steak ’n Shake’s policies there would 
be no injury. While Plaintiffs will face a heavier burden to 
establish causation should they eventually be put to their 
proof, their burden of establishing causation at the 
pleadings stage is less stringent. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 
(“[E]ach element [of standing] must be supported in the 
same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at the successive stages of the 
litigation.”). Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 
satisfied the traceability element of standing.  
C. Redressability 
The third standing element requires Plaintiffs to 
show that their injury “is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 
“This requires the plaintiff to show that it is ‘likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative,’ that the alleged injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.” Finkelman, 810 
F.3d at 194 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Although 
this third element of standing presents a close call, we 
conclude that Plaintiffs have satisfied it. 
Courts must be cognizant of “the rule that a ‘remedy 
must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced 
the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.’” Gill v. 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018) (quoting Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). Bearing in mind that 
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Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek remedies 
corresponding to mere procedural violations of the ADA, 
we consider whether the declaratory and injunctive relief 
Plaintiffs seek will likely satisfy the only injuries they 
have successfully alleged: physical injuries associated 
with ambulating through steeply graded parking facilities, 
and the deterrent effect that these injuries have on 
Plaintiffs’ ability to enjoy Steak ’n Shake’s services in the 
future.  
Plaintiffs provide three examples of injunctions, 
any one of which they contend would remedy their 
injuries. First, Plaintiffs propose that the District Court 
could develop “training protocols” intended to “ensure” 
that Steak ’n Shake’s maintenance employees “are aware 
of the ADA’s structural requirements and know how to 
identify access violations for prompt repair.” Appellee Br. 
50. Second, Plaintiffs propose that the District Court direct 
Steak ’n Shake “to conduct annual ADA-specific 
inspections to ensure accessibility has been maintained.” 
Id. Third, Plaintiffs propose that the District Court direct 
Steak ’n Shake “to refrain from engaging in its current 
practice” of performing ADA inspections only in response 
to complaints brought to the company’s attention by 
patrons. Id.  
Each of the proposed injunctions suffer from the 
same flaw: Not one specifically directs that an allegedly 
non-compliant parking facility slope be corrected. And if 
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an ADA-violative slope has not been remedied, the 
plaintiffs’ resultant injuries will persist. In order for any 
injuries to be remedied, Steak ’n Shake would need not 
only to adopt one of Plaintiffs’ proposed policies but also 
to take the additional step of actually implementing that 
policy. Obviously, mere adoption of a policy, without 
more, would not guarantee the correction of 
discriminatory barriers. Steak ’n Shake could be in 
compliance with a court order requiring them to adopt a 
new policy and still fail to correct access violations. In that 
case, failure to take the additional step of abiding by a 
newly-adopted corporate policy would not constitute a 
violation of the District Court’s injunction. It would 
merely be a violation of the policy itself. 
Yet even with this daylight between Plaintiffs’ 
proposed injunctions and the actual remedying of injuries, 
we recognize that a plaintiff need only establish that a 
favorable judicial decision be “likely” to remedy a 
plaintiff’s injury in fact. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Nothing 
before us suggests that individual Steak ’n Shake locations 
would prove unable or unwilling to adhere to a new 
corporate policy requiring the company to actively seek 
out access violations. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ complaint 
includes a request that the District Court “retain 
jurisdiction over this matter for a period to be determined,” 
in part “to ensure that [Steak ’n Shake] comes into 
compliance with the relevant requirements of the ADA.” 
JA 87. Such a retention of jurisdiction would permit the 
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District Court to address any potential failures by Steak ’n 
Shake to actually correct discriminatory barriers that were 
discovered as a result of new policies. We conclude, 
therefore, that the adoption of a policy similar to the three 
examples offered by Plaintiffs would likely remedy 
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Plaintiffs’ have satisfied all 
three elements of standing. 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SATISFY RULE 23(A) 
 As former-Judge Posner has described it, “[t]he 
class action is an ingenious procedural innovation that 
enables persons who have suffered a wrongful injury, but 
are too numerous for joinder of their claims alleging the 
same wrong committed by the same defendant or 
defendants to be feasible, to obtain relief as a group . . . .” 
Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). 
Given that class actions are “an exception to the usual rule 
that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the 
individual named parties only,” Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–701 (1979)), a plaintiff 
wishing to bring a lawsuit in federal court must first satisfy 
the explicit requirements set forth in Rule 23(a). This calls 
for a rigorous analysis that usually requires courts to make 
factual findings and legal conclusions that overlap the 
underlying merits of the suit. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011). Second, if the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, the party 
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seeking certification must also establish that her claim fits 
within one of the three types of class categories outlined 
in Rule 23(b). Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309 n.6 
(citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 155 (1982)).  
Here, Plaintiffs have sought to establish a Rule 
23(b)(2)16 class for which injunctive relief is appropriate 
to the class as a whole. JA 93. But in defining the certified 
class, the District Court’s Rule 23 analysis was flawed 
                                              
16 Rule 23(b)(2) requires establishing that “the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.” FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
Subdivision (b)(2) often involves “actions in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating 
unlawfully against a class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee notes. See also Karen Sandrik, Note, 
Overlooked Tool: Promissory Fraud in the Class Action 
Context, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 204 n.79 (2007) 
(recognizing that “[t]he prototype of [a Rule 23(b)(2)] 
action is a civil rights case”). Although the requirements 
of Rule 23 must always be satisfied regardless of the type 
of class seeking certification, this civil rights action under 
the ADA is indeed the type of action for which Rule 
23(b)(2) was originally designed. 
 
 32 
 
from the start. Citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 
785 (3d Cir. 1985), the District Court wrote that “when 
doubt exists concerning certification of the class, the court 
should err in favor of allowing the case to proceed as a 
class action.” JA 39. This was clear error. 
 As we have previously explained, the “relaxed” 
class certification standard suggested in Eisenberg did not 
survive the 2003 amendments to Rule 23.17 In Hydrogen 
Peroxide, we made clear that although the 2003 
amendments were “subtle,” they “reflect[ed] the need for 
                                              
17 For a brief description of some of the takeaways from 
the 2003 amendments, see Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: 
The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation 
Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1134 n.97 
(2011) (“The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 . . . eliminated 
the provision from prior Rule 23(c)(1)(C) allowing 
‘conditional’ certification of classes. . . . [And] Rule 
23(c)(1)(A) was altered, replacing the requirement to 
certify a class ‘as soon as practicable’ with an instruction 
to certify ‘at an early practicable time.’ The advisory 
committee’s notes state that ‘[a] court that is not satisfied 
that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should 
refuse certification until they have been met,’ and instruct 
courts that ‘it is appropriate to conduct controlled 
discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those aspects 
relevant to making the certification decision on an 
informed basis.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
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a thorough evaluation of the Rule 23 factors.” Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. The Hydrogen Peroxide 
opinion, a landmark in Third Circuit class action 
jurisprudence, went on to explain that:  
Although the trial court has discretion to 
grant or deny class certification, the court 
should not suppress ‘doubt’ as to whether a 
Rule 23 requirement is met—no matter the 
area of substantive law. Accordingly, 
Eisenberg should not be understood to 
encourage certification in the face of doubt as 
to whether a Rule 23 requirement has been 
met… Eisenberg predates the recent 
amendments to Rule 23 which, as noted, 
reject tentative decisions on certification and 
encourage development of a record sufficient 
for informed analysis. 
Id. at 321. Following Hydrogen Peroxide, we again 
dismissed Eisenberg’s outdated view in In re Schering 
Plough Corp. ERISA Litig.: 
Additionally, the Report and 
Recommendation invokes Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon for the proposition that 
“[u]ltimately, doubts are resolved in favor of 
class certification.” Our decision in 
Hydrogen Peroxide makes clear that 
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Eisenberg should not be read in this 
manner. . . . 
In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 
600 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).  
We repeat (hopefully for the last time): the 
“relaxed” Rule 23 standard suggested in Eisenberg is no 
longer the law of this circuit. When courts harbor doubt as 
to whether a plaintiff has carried her burden under Rule 
23, the class should not be certified. Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 321. Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere 
pleading standard.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. Instead, it 
calls for a rigorous analysis in which “[f]actual 
determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be made 
by a preponderance of the evidence,” Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 307. With that in mind, we consider whether 
Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s requirements.  
A. Numerosity 
 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be “so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). Like other factual determinations 
underlying Rule 23 determinations, it is a “plaintiff’s 
burden to demonstrate numerosity by a preponderance of 
the evidence.” Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 
349, 358 (3d Cir. 2013).  
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In recent years the numerosity requirement has been 
given “real teeth.” Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of 
Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 768 (2013). 
Although this strengthening of the numerosity inquiry has 
sometimes been criticized,18 our precedent nonetheless 
demands that a court “make a factual determination, based 
on the preponderance of the evidence, that Rule 23’s 
                                              
18 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, An Opt-in Option for Class 
Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 191–92 (2016) (“In the 
past, numerosity has not generally been a difficult criterion 
to satisfy. . . . But in today’s age of stringent attention to 
the certification requirements, including the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that the class must offer ‘significant 
proof’ of compliance, a number of courts have required 
proof of numerosity beyond what common sense might 
otherwise suggest.” (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 353) 
(footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of 
Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 773 (2013) (“The 
strict approach [to numerosity] adopted by some courts 
represents yet another troublesome trend.”). Some of this 
scholarship can be read as criticism of Dukes itself. See 
also Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (noting that “Rule 23 does not 
set forth a mere pleading standard,” but instead requires a 
“party seeking class certification . . . [to] affirmatively 
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is . . . be 
prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently 
numerous parties”). 
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requirements have been met.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 596. 
To make such a determination, a court must be presented 
with evidence that would enable the court to do so without 
resorting to mere speculation. Id. at 597 (referring to “the 
line separating inference and speculation”). 
In Marcus, we considered the claims of a plaintiff 
who had leased a BMW automobile with four Bridgestone 
“run-flat tires”19 and had alleged that those tires were 
defective. Id. at 588. The district court in that case certified 
a “class action brought on behalf of all purchasers and 
lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped with 
Bridgestone [run-flat tires] sold or leased in New Jersey 
with tires that have gone flat and been replaced.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). We vacated the district 
court’s certification order, in part because the plaintiff had 
failed to satisfy his numerosity burden. Id. In outlining the 
requirements of a successful numerosity showing, we 
explained that: 
Of course, Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a 
plaintiff to offer direct evidence of the exact 
number and identities of the class members. 
                                              
19 “As their name suggests, [run-flat tires] can ‘run’ while 
‘flat.’ Even if [a run-flat tire] suffers a total and abrupt loss 
of air pressure from a puncture or other road damage, the 
vehicle it is on remains stable and can continue driving for 
50 to 150 miles at a speed of up to 50 miles per hour.” 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 588. 
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But in the absence of direct evidence, a 
plaintiff must show sufficient circumstantial 
evidence specific to the products, problems, 
parties, and geographic areas actually 
covered by the class definition to allow a 
district court to make a factual finding. Only 
then may the court rely on “common sense” 
to forgo precise calculations and exact 
numbers. 
Id. at 596. One of the shortcomings of the district court’s 
numerosity analysis in Marcus was that although there 
was evidence of BMW purchases on a nationwide scale, 
there was no evidence indicating the portion of those 
purchases that might have occurred in New Jersey—the 
geographic limitation of the relevant class.  
 While we noted that it was “tempting to assume that 
the New Jersey class meets the numerosity requirement 
based on the defendant companies’ nationwide presence,” 
we rejected the idea that giving in to such temptation could 
excuse speculation. Id. at 597. Because the plaintiff had 
presented a “complete lack of evidence specific to BMWs 
purchased or leased in New Jersey with Bridgestone RFTs 
that have gone flat and been replaced,” we concluded that 
the district court’s “numerosity ruling crossed the line 
separating inference and speculation.” Id. 
Applying the reasoning of Marcus a year later in 
Hayes, we considered a plaintiff’s allegations that a 
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retailer violated a state consumer fraud statute by selling 
unredeemable service plans for products that were in 
reality sold “as-is.” Hayes, 725 F.3d at 352. In Hayes, the 
plaintiff presented evidence of over 3,500 transactions that 
included both the sale of a service plan and a price 
override. Id. at 353. Because a price override was 
something that a store cashier did when selling an “as-is” 
product, the district court had reasoned that numerosity 
was satisfied since, “if even 5% of those [3,500] price 
overrides were for as-is items ineligible for Service Plan 
protection, the class would be sufficiently numerous under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).” Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356. We 
disagreed.  
Although the district court in Hayes was correct in 
pointing out that a cashier would perform a price override 
when selling an “as-is” product, those cashiers also 
performed price overrides in other scenarios—such as 
when a customer “requests a discount because the item is 
sold for less elsewhere,” or when a customer “purchases 
an item and later finds it on sale.” Id. at 352. Transactions 
falling within these other scenarios were not part of the 
class definition, which was comprised of only customers 
who purchased a “Service Plan to cover as-is products.” 
Id. at 353.20 As we explained in Hayes: 
                                              
20 Another problem with the Hayes plaintiff’s attempt to 
rely on the 3,500 transactions calculation was that it did 
not account for how many of those transactions included 
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[P]laintiff did not fulfill his burden of 
supplying circumstantial evidence specific to 
the products and problems involved [in] the 
litigation and instead premised his argument 
for numerosity on improper speculation. The 
only concrete numerical evidence presented 
to the court was that New Jersey Sam’s Clubs 
had on record 3,500 transactions that 
included both a price-override and the sale of 
a Service Plan. But there is no factual basis 
for determining how many of these 3,500 
transactions included the purchase of a 
Service Plan for an as-is item . . . . In short, 
the only conclusion that can be drawn from 
the evidence presented to the trial court is that 
the number of class members would be equal-
to-or-less-than 3,500 and equal-to-or-greater-
than zero. Within that range, we can only 
speculate as to the number of class members. 
Id. at 357–58. 
Plaintiffs attempt to carry their numerosity burden 
by offering three strands of evidence—but that evidence 
ultimately falls short. First, Plaintiffs point to census data 
                                              
the sale of “as-is” products where the retailer ultimately 
honored the service plan—a factual characteristic that 
would have taken those transactions out of the class 
definition.  
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showing that “there are between 14.9 million to 20.9 
million persons with mobility disabilities who live in the 
United States.” Appellee Br. 41. Second, Plaintiffs point 
to a single off-hand comment made by a Steak ’n Shake 
executive speculating that it would be “fair” to say that 
“thousands of people with disabilities utilize [Steak ’n 
Shake] parking lots . . . each year.” Id. at 41–42 (citing JA 
155–56). Third, Plaintiffs ask this Court to use its 
“common sense” and conclude that numerosity has been 
satisfied. See id. 
 In assessing the sufficiency of these three strands of 
evidence, we begin by noting that although “[n]o 
minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a 
suit as a class action,” a plaintiff in this circuit can 
generally satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement 
by establishing “that the potential number of plaintiffs 
exceeds 40.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 
(3d Cir. 2001). In this light, Plaintiffs’ first strand of 
evidence—indicating that there are between 14.9 million 
to 20.9 million persons with mobility disabilities who live 
in the United States—suggests that it is highly likely that 
at least 40 of those individuals would have experienced 
access violations at one of the Steak ’n Shake locations at 
issue in this litigation. But although those odds might be 
enough for a good wager, we must be mindful that “[m]ere 
speculation as to the number of class members—even if 
such speculation is ‘a bet worth making’—cannot support 
 41 
 
a finding of numerosity.” Hayes, 725 F.3d at 357 (quoting 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 596).  
Plaintiffs point to a large number of disabled 
persons living in the United States. Yet they have 
presented no evidence that would permit us to use 
“common sense” to determine—rather than speculate 
about—the portion of those disabled individuals who have 
actually patronized a relevant Steak ’n Shake restaurant, 
let alone the portion who have experienced or will 
experience an ADA violation at one of those restaurants. 
As we explained in Hayes, “where a putative class is some 
subset of a larger pool, the trial court may not infer 
numerosity from the number in the larger pool alone.” Id. 
at 358; see also Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 
1256, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he district court’s 
inference of numerosity for a Florida-only class without 
the aid of a shred of Florida-only evidence was an exercise 
in sheer speculation. Accordingly, the district court abused 
its discretion by finding the numerosity requirement to be 
satisfied with respect to a Florida-only class.”). 
Plaintiffs’ second strand of evidence advances their 
Rule 23(a)(1) burden no further. The single statement of a 
Steak ’n Shake executive characterizing the number of 
patrons who use company parking lots does not assuage 
our concerns about speculation. The fact that one of 
defendant’s executives has himself speculated as to the 
number of disabled individuals who patronize a Steak ’n 
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Shake restaurant and traverse their parking lots adds 
nothing. Speculation “squared” is still speculation.  
 Perhaps sensing the weakness of their numerosity 
showing, Plaintiffs would have this court adopt the 
reasoning of the District Court that Rule 23(a)(1)’s 
numerosity requirement can be “relaxed in cases where 
injunctive and declaratory relief is sought.” JA 42; 
Appellee Br. 45–46 (arguing that a request for injunctive 
relief is something that necessarily “factor[s] positively 
into the numerosity analysis”). Attempting to support 
relaxation of the numerosity requirement, Plaintiffs cite to 
In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 
2016). To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to read Modafinil 
as suggesting that requests for injunctive relief relax Rule 
23(a)’s standards in favor of the party seeking class 
certification, Plaintiffs stretch Modafinil too far. We take 
this opportunity, then, to clarify the import of that 
decision.  
In Modafinil, we noted that: 
We have not had occasion to list relevant 
factors that are appropriate for district court 
judges to consider when determining whether 
joinder would be impracticable. We do so 
now. This non-exhaustive list includes: 
judicial economy, the claimants’ ability and 
motivation to litigate as joined plaintiffs, the 
financial resources of class members, the 
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geographic dispersion of class members, the 
ability to identify future claimants, and 
whether the claims are for injunctive relief or 
for damages. 
In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d at 252–53. We 
start by simply highlighting that the injunction versus 
damages question referred to in Modafinil represents but a 
single factor within a non-exhaustive list of six. But even 
more fundamentally, Modafinil does not state—nor should 
it be read to suggest—that a plaintiff seeking injunctive 
relief will have an easier time satisfying Rule 23(a)(1) 
than plaintiffs seeking monetary damages. Whether a 
plaintiff seeks injunctive or monetary relief, her Rule 
23(a)(1) burden remains the same. Modafinil simply seeks 
to elucidate the meaning of the word “impracticable” and 
suggests that when a court is determining whether a 
plaintiff has satisfied her burden of establishing whether 
joinder would be impracticable, the type of relief sought 
by a plaintiff may be one factor that a court takes into 
consideration. It will always be up to the district court to 
explain how the form of relief has impacted its analysis. 
In sum, because Plaintiffs have failed to present 
evidence sufficient to permit us to go beyond speculation 
as to the impracticability of joinder, we conclude that 
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1) burden. 
If Plaintiffs wish to attempt to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1) 
burden upon remand, they will need to provide evidence 
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that will permit the District Court to conclude that a 
sufficiently numerous group of disabled individuals have 
experienced or will experience ADA violations at a 
relevant Steak ’n Shake restaurant, and that joinder is 
thereby impracticable. 
B. Commonality 
 Rule 23(a)(2) requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
“there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Dukes, that “language is easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny 
competently crafted class complaint literally raises 
common questions.’” Dukes, 564 U.S at 349 (quoting 
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–132 (2009)) 
(internal quotations omitted). A complaint’s mere recital 
of questions that happen to be shared by class members is 
“not sufficient to obtain class certification.” Id. Rather, 
“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Id. at 
349–50 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157). 
The broad class definition certified by the District 
Court includes a commonality issue. As previously set 
forth, the District Court certified a class defined as: 
All persons with qualified mobility 
disabilities who were or will be denied the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
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services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 
accommodations of any Steak ’n Shake 
restaurant location in the United States on the 
basis of a disability because such persons 
encountered accessibility barriers at any 
Steak ’n Shake restaurant where Defendant 
owns, controls and/or operates the parking 
facilities. 
JA 75 (District Court Order).21 Although the final clause 
in this one sentence definition refers to “parking 
                                              
21 A district court’s certification order “must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Although “no particular format is 
necessary to meet the substantive requirement[s]” of Rule 
23(c)(1)(B), Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 2006), we have 
previously explained that the rule requires “that the text of 
the [certification] order or an incorporated opinion . . . 
include (1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise 
statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to 
be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and 
complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated 
on a class basis.” Id. at 187–88. This substantive 
requirement “necessitat[es] the full and clear articulation 
of the litigation’s contours at the time of class 
certification,” and is intended to help “facilitate 
meaningful appellate review of complex certification 
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facilities,” the definition does not strictly limit 
membership to those who have suffered harm within those 
parking facilities. The language adopted by the District 
Court is looser than that, and covers not only persons who 
allege that they have experienced ADA violations within 
a Steak ’n Shake parking facility but also class members 
who encountered “accessibility barriers at any Steak ‘n 
Shake restaurant.” JA 75. This could include claims, for 
instance, regarding the bathroom of a Steak ’n Shake that 
had maintained a perfectly ADA-compliant parking 
facility.  
To comprehend just how large the potential 
universe of ADA violations covered by this broad class 
definition is, consider the Department of Justice’s ADA 
Guide for Small Businesses, which defines “architectural 
barriers” as: 
[P]hysical features that limit or prevent 
people with disabilities from obtaining the 
goods or services that are offered. They can 
include parking spaces that are too narrow to 
                                              
decisions.” Id. at 186. See also Neale, 794 F.3d at 370  
(“We are not required to comb through the District Court’s 
opinion and layers of briefing in order to ‘cobble together 
the various statements . . . and reach a general inference as 
to some categories of issues that the District Court believes 
are appropriate for class treatment.’” (quoting Wachtel, 
453 F.3d at 189)). 
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accommodate people who use wheelchairs; a 
step or steps at the entrance or to part of the 
selling space of a store; round doorknobs or 
door hardware that is difficult to grasp; 
aisles that are too narrow for a person using a 
wheelchair, electric scooter, or a walker; a 
high counter or narrow checkout aisles at a 
cash register, and fixed tables in eating areas 
that are too low to accommodate a person 
using a wheelchair or that have fixed seats 
that prevent a person using a wheelchair from 
pulling under the table. 
ADA Guide for Small Businesses, at 3, available at 
https://www.ada.gov/smbusgd.pdf (emphases added). 
Moreover, the Department of Justice’s 2010 Title III ADA 
Regulations further illustrate the wide variety of different 
ADA violations that any one particular class member 
might allege to have encountered. For example, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.304 provides: 
Removal of Barriers. 
(a) General. A public accommodation shall 
remove architectural barriers in existing 
facilities, including communication barriers 
that are structural in nature, where such 
removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily 
accomplishable and able to be carried out 
without much difficulty or expense. 
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(b) Examples. Examples of steps to remove 
barriers include, but are not limited to, the 
following actions – 
(1) Installing ramps; 
(2) Making curb cuts in sidewalks and 
entrances; 
(3) Repositioning shelves; 
(4) Rearranging tables, chairs, vending 
machines, display racks, and other furniture; 
(5) Repositioning telephones; 
(6) Adding raised markings on elevator 
control buttons; 
(7) Installing flashing alarm lights; 
(8) Widening doors; 
(9) Installing offset hinges to widen 
doorways; 
(10) Eliminating a turnstile or providing an 
alternative accessible path; 
(11) Installing accessible door hardware; 
(12) Installing grab bars in toilet stalls; 
(13) Rearranging toilet partitions to increase 
maneuvering space; 
(14) Insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to 
prevent burns; 
(15) Installing a raised toilet seat; 
(16) Installing a full-length bathroom mirror; 
(17) Repositioning the paper towel dispenser 
in a bathroom; 
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(18) Creating designated accessible parking 
spaces; 
(19) Installing an accessible paper cup 
dispenser at an existing inaccessible water 
fountain; 
(20) Removing high pile, low density 
carpeting; or 
(21) Installing vehicle hand controls. 
28 C.F.R. § 36.304. Given the wide variety of violations 
that different class members might claim to have 
encountered, the class definition certified by the District 
Court runs directly into conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Dukes. 
 In Dukes, the Court considered a class of female 
employees alleging Title VII gender discrimination. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 343. In conducting a Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality inquiry, the Court explained: 
Commonality requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the class members “have 
suffered the same injury,” Falcon, supra, at 
157, 102 S.Ct. 2364. This does not mean 
merely that they have all suffered a violation 
of the same provision of law. Title VII, for 
example, can be violated in many ways—by 
intentional discrimination, or by hiring and 
promotion criteria that result in disparate 
impact, and by the use of these practices on 
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the part of many different superiors in a 
single company. Quite obviously, the mere 
claim by employees of the same company 
that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or 
even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, 
gives no cause to believe that all their claims 
can productively be litigated at once. Their 
claims must depend upon a common 
contention—for example, the assertion of 
discriminatory bias on the part of the same 
supervisor. That common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is 
capable of classwide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity 
will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke. 
Id. at 349–50 (emphasis added).  
 Applying the Court’s teaching in Dukes to the 
matter at hand, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ class presents 
a similar commonality challenge. Although all class 
members might allege a violation of the ADA—even the 
very same provision of the ADA—this only establishes 
that putative class members “merely” allege to “have all 
suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. at 
350. For purposes of satisfying Rule 23(a)(2), that is not 
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enough, because, like Title VII in Dukes, the ADA can be 
violated in many different ways. 
One person, for example, might allege that Steak ’n 
Shake violated the ADA by failing to correct a steep slope 
in a parking facility, while other class members might 
allege that Steak ’n Shake violated the ADA by failing to 
replace inaccessible door hardware, by failing to widen 
bathroom doors, or by failing to replace inaccessible water 
fountains. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304. While each of these 
Steak ’n Shake patrons presents a serious claim, the 
collective claims are so widely divergent that they would 
be better pursued on either an individual basis or by a 
sufficiently numerous class of similarly-aggrieved 
patrons. Such is the reach of the class as the District Court 
has defined it. With such a potentially wide array of 
different claims by members of the class, we conclude that 
the certified class fails to meet the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 
 Even assuming, arguendo, that a proper 
interpretation of the class definition would limit the class 
to members who suffered injuries within a Steak ’n Shake 
parking facility,22 the wide variety of regulations quoted 
                                              
22 Certification of a class is perhaps the most pivotal 
moment in the life of a class action. In light of the 
inappropriateness of certifying a class on tentative 
grounds, Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321, mere 
promises to interpret a class definition in a limited fashion 
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above reveal that there are still various types of ADA 
violations that could occur specifically in a parking 
facility. Plaintiffs’ own complaint, for example, lists seven 
different categories of parking facility violations. JA 90–
92. The complaint refers to: (1) parking space slopes; (2) 
access aisle slopes; (3) slopes relating to the route leading 
to a facility entrance; (4) lack of proper parking signage; 
(5) lack of proper “van accessible” designations; (6) 
improper mounting of “accessible” parking signage; and 
(7) “curb ramp” slopes. Id. Although all seven of these 
categories allegedly constitute ADA violations, they harm 
class members in materially different ways.  
A class member, for example, complaining that 
“accessible” parking signage was “mounted less than 60 
                                              
will not save an otherwise overly-broad class definition 
from failing to satisfy Rule 23. If a class is defined too 
broadly, the time to correct the flaw is at the time of 
certification, or soon thereafter. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
592 (“Even if the District Court shared counsel’s 
understanding of the class definition, counsel’s post hoc 
clarification is no substitute for a ‘readily discernible, 
clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the 
class . . . to be certified’ in either the certification order or 
accompanying opinion.” (quoting Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 
187)). 
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inches above the finished surface o[f] the parking area,” 
JA 91, has experienced harm different from that of a class 
member complaining that “[t]he surfaces of one or more 
access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%.” JA 92. As 
Dukes makes clear, suffering “a violation of the same 
provision of law” is not enough. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349. 
Instead, class members’ claims must “depend upon a 
common contention” that “is capable of classwide 
resolution . . . in one stroke.” Id. at 350. The wide variety 
of potential ADA violations captured in the broad class 
definition certified by the District Court does not lend 
itself to such a resolution. We therefore conclude that 
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).23 
C. The Need for Remand 
 In light of our resolution of the Rule 23(a) issues 
presented in this appeal, remand for further proceedings 
before the District Court is necessary. Upon remand, the 
parties may present the court with a newly-formulated 
class definition free of the Rule 23(a) deficiencies 
described above.  
                                              
23 Although determining the proper boundaries of a revised 
class definition is an issue better left to the District Court 
after remand, it seems to us that a class definition limited 
to slope-related injuries occurring within a parking facility 
would present a class definition much more likely to meet 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 
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 Specifically, as to Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity, 
Plaintiffs will need to provide additional evidence so that 
the District Court can draw reasonable inferences when 
considering how many disabled individuals might actually 
have experienced an ADA violation at a relevant Steak ’n 
Shake. This should not be a Herculean task. Plaintiffs’ 
census data carries much—but not all—of their Rule 23 
(a)(1) burden. Something more will be required to support 
a reasonable inference. As to Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, 
Plaintiffs must propose a class definition with a limited 
number of potential ADA violations. Such a class might, 
for example, be limited to slope-related injuries that occur 
within a Steak ’n Shake parking facility.24 
CONCLUSION 
 Plaintiffs seek to utilize the class action device to 
enforce one of our nation’s landmark civil rights laws. 
                                              
24 Given our disposition of this appeal on Rule 23(a) 
grounds, we need not reach the Rule 23(b) issues raised by 
defendants. Nonetheless, the District Court should take 
care to abide by both Dukes’ lesson that “Rule 23(b)(2) 
applies only when a single injunction or declaratory 
judgment would provide relief to each member of the 
class,” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360, as well as Rule 65’s 
requirements that any injunction “state its terms 
specifically,” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(B), and “describe in 
reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C). 
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However commendable the ultimate result Mielo and 
Heinzl seek may be, our analysis here is limited to two 
questions: First, whether Plaintiffs have Article III 
standing, and second, whether Plaintiffs have met their 
burdens under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 
While we conclude that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue 
their claims in federal court, we also conclude that 
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 
23(a). The District Court’s judgment will be reversed, and 
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
reconsideration of the class certification question. 
